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Abstract 
This report documents a probabilistic risk assessment of an existing power sup­
ply system at a large telecommunications ofﬁce. The focus is on characterizing the 
increase in the reliability of power supply through the use of two alternative power 
conﬁgurations. Telecommunications has been identiﬁed by the Department of Home­
land Security as a critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power 
systems supporting major telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor 
to major telecommunications outages. A logical approach to improve the robustness 
of telecommunication facilities would be to increase the depth and breadth of tech­
nologies available to restore power in the face of power outages. Distributed energy 
resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could provide one more onsite electric 
power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel generators fail. The 
analysis is based on a hierarchical Bayesian approach and focuses on the failure prob­
ability associated with each of three possible facility conﬁgurations, along with assess­
ment of the uncertainty or conﬁdence level in the probability of failure. A risk-based 
characterization of ﬁnal best conﬁguration is presented. 
3 
Acknowledgment

This project was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy through the Ofﬁce of Policy 
and Budget Analysis. The DOE Project Manager is Dr. Allan Hoffman. The authors 
acknowledge contributions from Sprint Corporation, and thank Larry Johnson and his team 
for assisting with conﬁguration clariﬁcation and data. Additionally, the authors thank Whit 
Allan of Leibman and Associates for his technical assistance, and Abbas Ahkil and the 
SNL DER team for their assistance with reliability assessments of gas ﬁred turbines and 
microturbines. 
4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Contents 
1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.1 Robust Telecommunications Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 Operational Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4 Analysis Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

5 Event Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5.1 Basic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5.2 Stochastic Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

6 Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

6.1 Utility Availablility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

6.2 Probability Distribution for Utility Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

6.3 Distribution for Generator Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6.4 Battery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

6.5 Base Case Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

7 Base Case Considering Utility Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

7.1 Utility Down-time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

7.2 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

8 Distributed Energy Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

8.1 Natural Gas Pipeline Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

8.2 Capstone Microturbine Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

8.3 Kawasaki Turbine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Appendix 
A Original Fault Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

B Base Case.v7 - WinBugs Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

C Capstone.v2- WinBugs Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

D Kawasaki.v5- WinBugs Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Figures 
MSB-1 Fault Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Base Case Fault Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Base Case Time Line of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

MSB-1 One-line Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

MSB-2 One-line Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Earth Station One-line Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Florida PSC Reliability Metrics (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

National Hurricane Center 2004 Season . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

5

9 Summary of Restoration Time (min) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

10 Summary of Failure Rate (events/yr) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

11 PDF of the Number of Utility Outages per Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

12 Utility Reliability Summary (TU ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

13 Diesel Generator Failure Rate Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

14 Generator Failure to Start Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

15 Generator Reliability Summary (TG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

16 Battery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

17 Battery Reliability Summary (TB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

18 Base Case Reliability Summary (Tbase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

19 Time Line with Utility Repair (Tdelta) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

20 PDF of the Rate of Utility Repairs per Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

21 Time to Restore Utility Power (TR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

22 Net Utility Down Time (Tdelta = TR − (TG + TB)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

23 Time Line for DER Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

24 Natural Gas Time to Failure (TNG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

25 Six Capstone C60 Turbines at Guisborough Hall, UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

26 Capstone Single Turbine Hours to Failure (TC1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

27 Capstone Conﬁguration w/7 Failures (Tcap7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

28 Facility Time to Failure w/Capstone Conﬁguration (TFC ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

29 Kawasaki Turbine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

30 Kawasaki Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

31 Kawasaki Turbine Hours to Failure (TK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

32 Facility Time to Failure for Kawasaki Conﬁguration (TFK ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

33 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

6

Executive Summary

Telecommunications has been identiﬁed by the Department of Homeland Security as a 
critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power systems supporting major 
telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor to major telecommunications out­
ages, as documented by analyses of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) outage 
reports by the National Reliability Steering Committee (under auspices of the Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions). There are two major issues that are having in­
creasing impact on the sensitivity of the power distribution to telecommunication facilities: 
deregulation of the power industry, and changing weather patterns. 
A logical approach to improve the robustness of telecommunication facilities would be 
to increase the depth and breadth of technologies available to restore power in the face of 
power outages. Distributed energy resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could pro­
vide one more onsite electric power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel 
generators fail. But does the diversity in power sources actually increase the reliability of 
offered power to the ofﬁce equipment, or does the complexity of installing and managing 
the extended power system induce more potential faults and higher failure rates? 
The goal of this effort is to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) on an ex­
isting power conﬁguration for a large telecommunications ofﬁce (a Sprint Mega-Site with 
battery backup, and diesel generator backup) and for two alternative power conﬁgurations 
involving gas turbines as a primary power source. The analysis focuses on the failure prob­
ability associated with each of the three facility conﬁgurations, along with some assessment 
of the uncertainty or conﬁdence level in the failure probability estimate. Aging effects are 
not included in the analysis. Failure probability estimates will provide a necessary com­
ponent to service availability estimates from the alternative conﬁgurations, but availability 
estimates per se will not be part of the study. 
Due to the importance of time and the operational dependencies between power system 
elements, the analysis approach taken involved modeling the supply of power to the facility 
as a stochastic process. The time to failure for each of the elements necessary to provide 
power were modeled as a random variable with an associated probability distribution func­
tion. Due to the limited availability of data, the parameters of the distributions were further 
assumed to be random variables. This approach provided a basis for conducting a risk-
based comparison of the alternative power conﬁgurations. 
The system analyzed in the report involved a telecommunications facility consisting of 
two switch-bays and a satellite reception system. Power is supplied through a 12470 V 
public utility line. In the event of the loss of power from the utility, there are three diesel 
generators available and sufﬁcient fuel to operate each of the generators for 72 hours. At 
least two of the three generators are needed to provide the minimum level of power. In the 
event that generator power is lost, a backup system of lead-acid batteries can be used to 
provide a minimum level of power for up to 4 hours. 
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For this analysis, a worse case scenario was assumed; typical of that encountered in the 
event of a severe weather event. If utility power was lost, it was assumed that restoration 
of power could not be achieved before all segments of the backup power were system were 
exhausted. Similarly, if a diesel generator or gas turbine failed, minor repair was possible, 
but replacement of the entire generator (or turbine) was not an option. The only available 
fuel for the generators was that currently stored on-site (assumed to be 72 hours worth 
for each generator); fuel lost through consumption or contamination could not be replaced 
within the 4 hours of power assumed to be available from the backup batteries. 
Three scenarios were investigated. The ﬁrst scenario to be investigated was the current 
conﬁguration, referred to as the Base Case. As discussed above, this consisted of utility 
power, with backup diesel generators and a bank of batteries. Two alternative power system 
were also investigated; both of these involved the use of turbines fueled by natural gas. 
The ﬁrst conﬁguration consisted of an array of 24 60kW Capstone microturbines. All 
24 turbines were under constant load and a minimum combination of 18 turbines were 
required to provide the minimum level of power for the facility. The second conﬁguration 
involved the use of a single Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the primary power source. For 
both turbine conﬁgurations, the reliability of the natural gas supply was included in the 
reliability characterization. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analyses. Comparing the median time to failure 
(TTF) for each conﬁguration, it is easy to see that the use of the single Kawasaki turbine 
was by far the most promising alternative with a 76-fold increase in the expected operation 
time. The array of Capstone microturbines also showed promise with more than a 6-fold 
increase in power supply reliability. 
Table 1. Analysis Summary 
Time to Failure 10.00% median 90.00% 
Capstone TTF TFC 2698 4960 8706 
Kawasaki TTF TFK 7969 59010 249100 
Base Case Total Tbase 178.8 776.9 2531 
A risk-based perspective provided even more support for the conclusions and permitted 
accounting for the uncertainty in the available failure information. Consider a comparison 
between the reliability of the current power supply (i.e. Base Case) and the array conﬁgura­
tion of Capstone microturbines suggested by Sprint. There is a 90% chance that the utility 
power will fail before 2531 hours, while there is a 90% chance that the Capstone array will 
provide power for at least 2698 hours. Finally, consider that there is a 90% probability that 
the Capstone array will fail to provide power for less than approximately 8706 hours, while 
there is a 90% probability that the single Kawasaki turbine will provide power for at least 
7969 hours. 
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It should be noted that a signiﬁcant element in the lower reliability estimate for the Cap­
stone was the conﬁguration and operational plan suggested by Sprint. Other conﬁgurations 
could have quite different reliability characteristics and may warrant further investigation. 
However, there are installation issues associated with the Capstone, e.g. special enclosure, 
that could be a factor in the ﬁnal decision also. 
In conclusion, given the operational scenario assumed and given the uncertainties in the 
three alternatives, the suggested choice is the use of the Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the 
primary power source for the Sprint telecommunication facility. 
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Impact of Distributed Energy

Resources on the Reliability of a

Critical Telecommunications Facility

1 Background 
Telecommunications has been identiﬁed by the Department of Homeland Security as a 
critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power systems supporting major 
telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor to major telecommunications out­
ages, as documented by analyses of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) outage 
reports by the National Reliability Steering Committee (under auspices of the Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions). There are two major issues that are having in­
creasing impact on the sensitivity of the power distribution to telecommunication facilities: 
deregulation of the power industry and changing weather patterns. 
In 1995-96 Sandia National Laboratories initiated a study of the impact of deregulation 
on the reliability of the bulk power network [28, 27, 28]. The initial study was based on 
the ERCOT power grid and was extended to examine the impact of deregulation on the 
reliability of the Western States Coordinating Council (WSCC) bulk power network. The 
conclusions of both of these studies highlighted two issues: lack of reserve generation and 
insufﬁcient/poorly located transmission capacity. The conclusion of the investigation was 
that, unless a national regulatory body interceded, the result of restructuring would be a 
national bulk power system that was more sensitive to external disturbance. 
A major factor on both the operation of the network and the consumer consumption 
will be the growing uncertainty in weather events [11, 12, 21, 31]. One of the most 
widely recognized experts in understanding the impact of weather is Sir John Houghton. In 
Houghton’s book [13], he notes that the recent changes are not part of a short term trend, 
but are part of a much longer, sustained change. Houghton summarizes weather changes 
over the 21st century and suggests that, among other signiﬁcant climate phenomena, it is 
expected that there will be: 
•	 more intense precipitation events 
•	 increased summer temperatures (leading to higher cooling demands) 
•	 increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities, accompanied by increased mean 
and peak precipitation intensities, 
•	 increased intensity of mid-latitude storms leading to increased infrastructure losses 
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All of these will have ﬁrst or second order impacts on the telecommunications and power 
infrastructures. There is no incentive for the power utilities to make their systems more 
robust to these disturbances; rather, the industry has moved to change the reliability report­
ing requirements to avoid ﬁnancial penalties [30]. As noted by Sandia researchers in 2000, 
telecommunication companies, emergency services, etc. dependent on a reliability source 
of power need to be prepared for increased uncertainty in the operation of the national 
electrical infrastructure [16]. 
1.1 Robust Telecommunications Infrastructure 
One approach toward improving the robustness of the power systems supporting telecom­
munications ofﬁces is to improve the reliability of the necessary supply of power. Current 
best practices involve a combination of onsite battery backup (for short, intermittent power 
interruptions) and diesel generators (for longer term interruptions). Occasionally, universal 
power systems (UPS) technologies are also used for speciﬁc data communications equip­
ment backup. 
A logical approach to improve reliability would be to increase the depth and breadth 
of technologies available to restore power in the face of power outages. Distributed en­
ergy resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could provide one more onsite electric 
power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel generators fail. But does the 
diversity in power sources actually increase the reliability of offered power to the ofﬁce 
equipment, or does the complexity of installing and managing the extended power system 
induce more potential faults and higher failure rates? 
The goal of this effort is to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) on an ex­
isting power conﬁguration for a large telecommunications ofﬁce (a Sprint Mega-Site with 
battery backup, and diesel generator backup) and for two alternative power conﬁgurations 
adding gas microturbines as a primary power source. The product from the study will be 
a failure probability associated with each of the three facility conﬁgurations, along with 
some assessment of the uncertainty or conﬁdence level in the failure probability estimate. 
Aging effects will not be included in the analysis. Failure probability estimates will provide 
a necessary component to service availability estimates from the alternative conﬁgurations, 
but availability estimates per se will not be part of the study. 
2 Introduction 
Distributed energy resources technology is a growing focus of research across the energy 
industry and within the Department of Energy. For example, Sandia National Laboratories 
has established the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory (DETL) to assist in the de­
velopment and implementation of distributed energy resources. DETL tests microturbine, 
engine-generator, photovoltaic, fuel cell, and energy-storage technologies both individually 
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and in a collective microgrid. Collaborators include manufacturers, utilities, the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), DOE, DoD, the California Energy Commission, 
universities, standards organizations, and other national and private laboratories. Energy 
security is one of several important beneﬁts that distributed energy resources will offer to 
the nations electric power infrastructure. 
Natural gas turbines, or microturbines, derivatives of aircraft auxiliary power systems, 
are one DER technology for cogeneration with particular appeal. Turbines are highly efﬁ­
cient with fuel conversion efﬁciency on the order of 40% and have a number of fuel options 
including biofuels, ethanol and natural gas. These turbines are designed for continuous op­
eration, generally operating at 90% of their rated value. Emissions are necessarily low to 
meet the local environmental pollution requirements (e.g. California NOx limit of 2.5 ppm, 
6 ppm of CO corrected to 15% exhaust oxygen). 
Two gas turbine alternatives are investigated in the following sections. The ﬁrst conﬁgu­
ration is based on a generation package composed of 4 pallets of 6 Capstone microturbines. 
The second conﬁguration is based on a single Kawasaki turbine. Both are co-located with a 
remote telecommunication facility and operate off an external supply of natural gas. In both 
cases, the primary source of power is co-generation production with the utility subsuming a 
role as a backup source of power in the event of turbine system failure. The existing diesel 
generators (in conjunction with the facility battery system) would then be employed if both 
the turbines and utility power become unavailable. 
However, the objective of this effort is to investigate the impact of distributed energy 
resources (DER) on the reliability of the power supplied to the telecommunications center. 
The following section outlines the operational scenario assumed with this study and the 
analysis approach. Following this is a discussion of the fundamental issue driving this 
analysis: the uncertainty associated with the ability of the local utility to supply power to 
the telecommunications center. The current facility conﬁguration, referred to as the Base 
Case, is then characterized. 
3 Operational Scenario 
Sandia was requested to analyze the impact of distributed energy resources on the reliability 
of a telecommunication center, assuming that the time to repair was not a factor. This 
analysis constraint, effectively assumes that the facility is isolated from major logistics 
support, and operation is restricted to the physical equipment currently available for a given 
conﬁguration. Such a situation might result, for example, from a severe weather incident. 
The location of interest is the Sprint Orlando wireline switch facility. This facility is 
remote - access is via approximately 7 miles of unpaved roads. The utility power at this 
particular location is particularly unreliable requiring an unusual reliance on standby power 
at the facility. In the most recent four year period there were 35 utility outages (compared 
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with a national average of approximately 3 outages per year for 2001 and 2002) [23, 24, 
26, 25] 
For this analysis, an (almost) worse case scenario is assumed. If utility power is lost, 
restoration of power will not occur within a time period that will have a signiﬁcant impact. 
(The impact of this assumption is investigated early in the report.) Similarly, if a diesel 
generator or gas turbine fails, minor repair is possible, but replacement of the entire gener­
ator (or turbine) is not an option. The only available fuel for the generators is that currently 
stored on-site (assumed to be 72 hours worth for each generator); fuel lost through con­
sumption or contamination cannot be replaced within 4 hours. The time of 4 hours is used 
since the batteries are required to provide a minimum level of support for the plants for an 
additional 4 hours in the event that power is lost from the generators. 
4 Analysis Approach 
The focus of this effort is to characterize the impact of distributed energy resources (DER) 
on the reliability of a major telecommunication center. Sandia was initially asked to focus 
on the application of fault trees for characterizing the reliability impact and a typical fault 
tree developed to support the analysis is depicted in Figure 1. The remaining fault trees are 
presented in Appendix A. 
The telecommunication center consists of a main facility supported by two switch bays 
(MSB-1 and MSB-2) and the Earth Station. Power is supplied to the facility primarily 
through a traditional utility drop. In the event that utility power is lost, at least two of the 
on-location 1.5MW diesel generators must function. In addition to the two generators, the 
battery system must be available to provide minimal support for an addditional 4 hours in 
the event that the generators fail. 
However, for the DER conﬁgurations to be explored in this effort, the majority of the 
elements in MSB-1, MSB-2 and the Earth Station would be consistent ﬁxtures. In addi­
tion, the fuses, breakers, and other components which lend complexity to the analysis have 
demonstrated extremely high reliability over many years of ﬁeld operation and would not 
have a signiﬁcant impact on the reliability assessment. For this reason, it was decided to 
simplify the fault trees and a typical simpliﬁed fault tree is presented in Figure 2. However, 
the need to consider repair was raised as a possible area for investigation. For this reason it 
was decided not to explore the use of fault trees to support the analysis. 
Two alternative analysis approaches were then considered: Markov Chains and stochas­
tic processes. The initial review of the data suggested a great deal of variability in possible 
parameter estimates. In addition, there was the increasing likelihood of wide variation in 
the scenarios and equipment conﬁgurations to be investigated. For these reasons, it was 
ﬁnally decided to employ a stochastic process approach based in Bayesian statistics (to 
account for uncertainty in parameter values). 
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Figure 1. MSB-1 Fault Tree
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Figure 2. Base Case Fault Tree 
The stochastic process approach allows the analysis to be broken down into a series 
of potentially dependent events. The parameters characterizing the length of each of the 
events will be assumed to be random variables with uncertainty about the parameters of the 
probability density functions. 
5 Event Characterization 
5.1 Basic Approach 
The standard methods and data used to estimate the reliability of power systems are docu­
mented in the IEEE Std 493-1997 IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable 
Industrial and Commercial Power Systems [2]. A traditional approach is not applied be­
cause of the sequential, time-dependent nature of how the system is operated. Analysis 
methods associated with Markov Chains were investigated and showed promise as an alter­
native that allowed inclusion of repair. However, Markov Chains rely on a strong historical 
basis for estimating failure and repair rates. 
As noted previously, the lack of an extensive database suggests addressing uncertainty 
in parameter values, e.g. the failure rate of natural gas pipelines. The approach used in 
this analysis assumes that the rate at which failure occurs or the time required for repair 
will be random variables; that is, the time to failure distribution will actually be a family 
of distributions. As more information and/or experience is gained, then the family of dis­
tributions collapses to a single distribution and more traditional methods, such as Markov 
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Chains, can be employed. Speciﬁcally, if there was conﬂict or confusion regarding the ﬁnal 
decision, these advanced methods would provide insight into areas where funding spent on 
additional data would be of greatest return. 
For illustration of the approach, consider the supply of utility power. There are two el­
ements to the analyses of power availability: rate at which failures occur and, for the utility 
power, the time required to restore service. Failure events will be assumed to occur after 
periods of time Ti has passed. The length of time will be considered a random variable and 
the choice of the underlying distribution will be a function of the system element being ana­
lyzed. For example, since there is not sufﬁcient information to support a more complicated 
characterization of the utility failure rates, the times will be assumed to be exponentially 
distributed random variables: Ti ∼ exp[−λit], where λi represents the rate at which fail­
ures occur. Similarly, the length of time to recover from an outage, will be considered a 
random variable characterized with an exponential distribution: Tj ∼ exp[−µ jt], where µ j 
represents the rate at which repairs occur. (Note that the assumption of the exponential 
distribution is also consistent with the reliability approach outlined in IEEE Std 493-197.) 
Since there is signiﬁcant variability in the failure (and repair) rates from year-to-year, 
the failure rate for the outage time will also be considered a random variable. The prob­
ability distribution function describing the uncertainty in the utility failure rate, λ will be 
assumed to be a gamma distribution: 
g(λ|α,θ) = 
Γ
θ
(α
α 
)
λα−1 exp[−θλ], λ,α,θ > 0. 
5.2 Stochastic Process 
Figure 3 depicts a typical sequence of events. Each event logically follows at the conclusion 
of the previous event. For example, for the Base Case, the time that the utility is available 
TU is randomly selected from f (T |λU )= exp[−λUt]. Since the rate at which the utility fails, 
λU , is not known with certainty, a random parameter is chosen from the distribution Λ ∼ 
g(λ|α,θ). Because of the conditional structure of the the distributions for T and λ, Gibbs 
sampling must be used. The WinBugs computer software was used for all simulations 
conducted in this report [29] and the computer codes for each system conﬁguration are 
provided in the Appendices. 
Similar to the utility reliability, values for diesel generator operation reliability, TG, 
and battery reliability, TB are simulated. The values are then combined to get the time 
until system failure, Tbase = TU + TG + TB. Figure 3 depicts the typical time line of events 
associated with what is referred to in the following discussion as the Base Case. 
The following sections address each of the elements of the various scenarios. The Base 
Case is a function of the availability of power from the utility, the backup diesel generators, 
and the batteries. The additional alternatives explored include the addition of natural gas 
microturbines from Capstone and Kawasaki. 
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6 Base Case

TU
0
TG
TB
Utility w/o Repair
Base Case
2/3
Fuel
Available
Gen
Start
Figure 3. Base Case Time Line of Events 
The primary reliability impact of DERs will be related to their use to augment or replace 
utility power as the primary power source. The utility (or DER) is then coupled with 
combinations of diesel generators and the battery backup systems within the facility. The 
current backup power for MSB-1 and MSB-2 is provided through three 1.5 mW stationary 
diesel generators and the option of two mobile 1.5 mW generators. The Earth Station has 
a separate backup power source consisting of two 300 kW generators. 
The Base Case (depicted in Figure 3) is deﬁned as the conﬁguration of the telecom­
munication center as it exists today - without support of additional distributed energy re­
sources. The telecommunication center consists of a main facility supported by two switch 
bays (MSB-1 and MSB-2) and the Earth Station. Power is supplied to the facility primarily 
through a traditional utility drop. In the event that utility power is lost, at least two of the 
on-location diesel generators must function. In addition to the two generators, the battery 
system must be available to provide minimal support for an addditional 4 hours in the event 
that the generators fail. 
The current analysis is based on the peak power requirement for MSB-1 and MSB-2 
of approximately 1.1mW (total) and 65kW for the Earth Station. These requirements may 
expand as the demand on the system grows; additional ﬁxed and mobile generators can be 
added to the Base Case to increase the backup power capacity. 
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The one-line diagrams for the Base Case are presented in Figures 4, 5 and 6. (For 
reference, the original fault trees for each of the three major elements are provided in 
Appendix A.) 
6.1 Utility Availablility 
To be consistent with the literature, the terms utility availability and utility reliability will 
be used synonomously. The reliability of the utility power source will be deﬁned as the 
probability that, at any point in time, the telecommunication center is supplied with sufﬁ­
cient power from the local utility. For this study this probability is effectively the fraction 
of time that utility power is available at the telecommunications center. 
Power utility reliability is typically characterized using a number of indices proscribed 
the IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indicies (IEEE Std 1366-2003 [1]); 
however, not all states have adopted standards as a means of characterizing utility power 
reliability. For example, the state of Florida has requirements for reporting reliability met­
rics, but no quality of service incentives or penalties and the state of New Mexico has no 
power reliability requirements [6]. In addition, weather is recognized by the utilities as a 
major inﬂuence in estimating these indices and, in most cases, power disruptions related to 
severe weather are discounted in the calculations. For example, major events are not nec­
essarily included in reliability indices where a major event might be deﬁned as an outage 
where more than 10% of the customers within a region are without electricity and power is 
not restored within a 24 hour period [30]. 
The following discussion summarizes the major reliability measures used by public 
power utilies. An interruption is considered countable if the time duration of the interrup­
tion exceeds 5 minutes. All indices deﬁned below are for sustained interruptions. Let NT 
be the total number of customers served, and Ni be the number of interrupted customers for 
each sustained interruption. 
System average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) The system average interruption 
frequency index indicates how often the average customer experiences a sustained 
interruption. 
Total Number of Customers Interrupted 
SAIFI =
Number of Customers Served 
∑i Ni CI = = 
NT NT 
System average interruption duration index (SAIDI) This index indicates the total du­
ration of interruption for the average customer. It is commonly measured in customer 
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Figure 4. MSB-1 One-line Diagram
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Figure 5. MSB-2 One-line Diagram
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Figure 6. Earth Station One-line Diagram
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minutes or customer hours of interruption. Let ri be the restoration time for each in­
terruption event: 
Total Number of Customer Interruptions 
SAIDI =
Number of Customers Served 
∑i riNi CMI = = 
NT NT 
Customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) CAIDI represents the average 
time required to restore service. 
Total of Customer Interruption Duration 
CAIDI =
Total Number of Customers Interrupted 
∑i riNi SAIDI = = 
∑i Ni SAIFI 
Lbar The overall average length of the outages 
Minutes of Interruption 
Lbar = 
Total Number of Outages 
Note that the CAIDI index can be deceptively low since customers may be counted 
multiple times; once for each interruption. An alternative measure that is not generally 
reported by utilities is the Customer total average interruption duration index (CTAIDI), 
which counts customers with multiple interruptions only once (Ni
∗): 
Total of Customer Interruption Duration 
CTAIDI = 
Total Number of Customers Interrupted (*) 
∑i riNi = 
∑i Ni∗ 
Service availability is given by:

Total Customer Hours of Service

ASAI = 
Total Customers Hours Demand 
(8760)NT − ∑i riNi =
(8760)NT 
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6.1.1 Florida Public Service Commission Data 
The state of Florida, while not having Quality of Service requirements, does require each 
utility to submit a formal report documenting the reliability metrics for the previous year [8]. 
Data is adjusted to account for severe storm events; it is believed, but not conclusively clear, 
that Florida requires the utilities to use the IEEE Std 1366 [1] deﬁnitions to adjust the met­
rics for major events. Table 2 summarizes the 2005 report for the data obtained in 2004 
and Figure 7 depicts the data graphically. Note that some of the utilities reported an ap­
proximate 20% improvement in 2004 numbers over those from 2003 after one of the most 
notable hurricane seasons on record (Figure 8). 
Table 2. Summary of Utility Recovery Time Related Metrics 
Utility Reliability Metrics 
SAIDI CAIDI LBAR SAIFI 
PEF 77 64.7 111.9 1.19 
FPL 73.9 59.4 181 1.24 
FPUC 138.06 107.47 77.35 1.26 
GULF 93.33 105.93 129.55 0.88 
TECO 72.63 75.26 178.07 0.97 
Average 
Std Dev 
90.98 82.55 135.57 
27.60 22.78 44.32 
1.11 
0.17 
6.1.2 Sprint Data 
In the four years, 2001-2004, Sprint noted 35 incidents where power to the switching sta­
tion was disrupted [25] for a failure rate estimate of 8.75 events/year. In addition, Sprint 
collected data on the length of diesel generator operation during these same outages. This 
may be a consideration since the utility may not demonstrate stability immediately follow­
ing an outage; the facilities continue to use the already functioning diesel generators during 
this additional period. 
•	 Data are not available for the speciﬁc incidents, but similar Sprint telecommunication 
facilities have experienced power outages with an average outage time of µoutage = 
6.45 hours, and a standard deviation of σoutage = 6.54 hours [22]. To appreciate the 
uncertainty in outage length, the shortest duration was an instantaneous outage, while 
the longest outage lasted approximately 27 hours. 
•	 The generators during these incidents were in-use for lengths of time with the fol­
lowing mean and standard deviation: µGenrun = 9.41 hours, σGenrun = 8.14 hours. 
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Figure 8. National Hurricane Center 2004 Season
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6.1.3 IEEE Std 493-1997 
As noted previously, the standard methods and data used to estimate the reliability of power 
systems is documented in the IEEE Std 493-1997 [2]. While an industry standard, the 
source of much of the data relevant to this effort are from surveys taken prior to 1976. 
Reference [2], Table 3-33, suggests using an average outage duration of 125 minutes (2.08 
hours). 
For utility supplies to industrial plants where the voltage line is ≤ 15kV the suggested 
failures per year (again from Table 3-33 [2]) is 3.621. (Note that when veriﬁable opera­
tional/ﬁeld information is not available, data from this standard will be used in the analysis.) 
6.1.4 Loss of Off-site Power (LOSP) 
A second, very reliable source of utility data is available from each of the 103 nuclear power 
plants across the US. It is well recognized that the availability of power to commercial 
nuclear power plants is essential for safe operations and accident recovery. A loss of offsite 
power (LOSP) event is therefore considered an important contributor to total risk at nuclear 
power plants [3]. 
However, caution must be used when using data from nuclear plants related to utility 
availability since utilities will do everything possible to assure delivery of power to the 
nuclear plant; both for safety reasons and since nuclear power plants provide a signiﬁcant 
base power load. For example, the two major electrical disturbances on July 2, 1996 and 
August 10, 1996 that blacked-out most of the western US, did not results in LOSP events. In 
addition, for similar reasons, restoration times for nuclear plants can be substantially shorter 
than for industrial loads. Finally, since reactors will often be shutdown in anticipation of a 
grid or weather related disturbance, the rate at which off-site power is lost is not applicable 
to the current analysis. Highlights of the published data [3]: 
•	 Recovery time for grid-related events ranged from 125 to 360 minutes with a mean 
of 190.2 minutes and a standard deviation of 97.4 minutes 
•	 The time to recover from weather related incidents ranged from 37 minutes to 5.5 
days, with a mean of 1258 minutes and a 90% probability interval of [23, 5009] 
using a log-normal probability density function. 
6.1.5 Utility Data Input Summary 
Figures 9 and 10 summarize the data available for restoration time and failure rate. The data 
from the utilities reported to the Florida Public Service Commission likely discounts severe 
events of any type, e.g. weather, and is therefore optimistic. While not clear, the estimates 
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from the IEEE Std 493 most likely have similar liabilities. The values developed for the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reported to support LOSP estimates lean toward the 
optimistic side since reactors are shutdown in anticipation of severe events. 
For the remainder of the analyses, the mean restoration and failure rate data from Sprint 
will be used to support the utility availability analyses since this data appears to be the most 
realistic and applicable to the problem being investigated. 
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Figure 9. Summary of Restoration Time (min) 
6.2 Probability Distribution for Utility Reliability 
It is assumed that the length of time that a utility is up and operating, TU , is an exponen­
tially distributed random variable with parameter λ: f (t λ) = exp[−λt]. The parameter λ 
represents the number of utility interruptions per year. 
|
However, the estimate λˆ = 8.75 
represents a simple average rate at which events occurred over the four years; in reality, 
there will be a great deal of variation or uncertainty about the rate, λ at which events might 
occur each year. 
Therefore, let λ be a random variable with an average value of 8.75. Without addi­
tional information regarding how the rate varies each year, the assumption of a Gamma 
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distribution for λ is the simplest assumption that can be made: 
f (λ|α,β) = 
βαΓ
1 
(α)
λα−1 exp −
β
λ 
,λ > 0 
A distribution for λ and the mean of that distribution are now available. To completely 
describe the Gamma distribution, one more assumption is necessary to characterize the 
second parameter of the distribution. Assume that we are conﬁdent that the rate at which 
events occur lies in the range [2, 14] events/year. This range will typically reﬂect [µ −
3σ,µ + 3σ]. Solving, we ﬁnd that a standard deviation of σ = 2.0 is a good place to start. 
The mean and variance for the Gamma distribution are given by E[λ] = αβ = 8.75, 
and V [λ] = αβ2 = 4, respectively. Simultaneously solving the two equations for the two 
unknowns yields values of: α = 19.1406 failures/year and β = 0.457143. 
The resulting probability density function (PDF) describing the uncertainty in the num­
ber of utility outages each year is presented in Figure 11. As noted previously, assume 
that the length of time that a utility is up and operating, TU , is an exponentially distributed 
random variable with parameter λ: f (t|λ) = exp[−λt]; since the failure rate, λ is a random 
variable, the PDF f (t|λ) will inherently have an associated probabilistic uncertainty. 
Figure 12 depicts this uncertainty as a probability band about the utility time to failure, 
TU : there is a 90% probability that the power will be continuously available for more than 
1126 hours, a 50% chance that it will be available for less than 106 hours, and a 90% 
probability that power will be available for less than 2484 hours. 
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6.3 Distribution for Generator Reliability 
Failure of a diesel generator is deﬁned as a malfunction of the generator or associated 
support subsystems that prevents the generator from starting and running when a demand 
has occurred. Failures can occur in two modes: 
Failure to start (FTS) A failure of the generator to either manually or automatically start 
on a bus under-voltage condition, reach rated voltage and speed, close the output 
breaker, or sequence safety-related electrical loads onto the respective safety-related 
bus. 
Failure to run (FTR) A failure of the generator to continue to supply power to its respec­
tive safety-related electrical bus given the generator successfully started. 
Using IEEE Std 493 [2], engineers at Sprint estimated a mean time to failure (MTTF) for 
diesel generators of 9056 hours with a mean time to repair of 3.9 hours [25]. However, 
the expected failure rate (λ = 1/MT T F) for diesel generators used in nuclear power plants 
(NPPs) is approximately 0.0223 failures/hour. In addition, for diesel generators at nuclear 
power plants the Pr{failure to start} = 0.0241 per demand [9, 10]. 
As with the utility analysis, the reliability of the generators will be assumed to be a 
random variable described by the distribution: 
R(t|λ) = exp(−λt) 
The required operating period for the generators is t = 72 hours at which time the fuel at 
the facility is expended; refueling is assumed to not be possible. 
Given the wide disparity in the reliability data for the diesel generators, assume that the 
time to failure for the generators is a random variable. The failure rate for the NPP diesel 
generators: λ = 0.00223 is based on considerable data for a variety of diesel generators 
from across the nuclear power plant industry. However, based on operational experience, 
Sprint has also published an estimate of λ = 0.00011 failures/hours for the generators. 
Given the strong historical basis, λ = 0.00223 will be used as the expected time to 
failure and it will be assumed that the λ = 0.00011 is a lower 5% credibility limit (i.e. 95% 
probability that the true MTTF is less than 9056 hours). A gamma distribution will be used 
to describe the variation in the generator failure rate: 
f (λ|α,β) = 
βαΓ
1 
(α)
λα−1 exp −
β
λ 
,λ > 0 
The mean and variance are given by E[λ] = αβ, V [λ] = αβ2, respectively. Simultaneously 
solving these two equations: 
E[λ] = αβ Z 0.00011 � � 
F(λ < 0.00011|α,β) = 
βαΓ
1 
(α) 0 
λα−1 exp − λ
β 
≈0.05 
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for the two unknowns yields values of: α = 0.0001115 failures/hours or α = 0.976741 
failures per year and β = 20. (Units of years are used in the remainder of the analysis 
for consistency.) Given these parameters, the expected number of diesel generator failures 
per year is approximately 19.54. The resulting probability density function describing the 
uncertainty in the rate at which failures occur is presented in Figure 13. The results are 
presented for a single generator; recall that at least two of the three generators must func­
tion. Also, the point estimates initially provided by Sprint and the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission are noted. 
6.3.1 Failure to Start 
Deﬁne p to be the probability that a generator will not start on demand. Let p be a beta 
distributed random variable conditioned on the variables r, s: 
f (p|r,s) = 
B(
1 
r,s) 
pr−1(1− p)s−1 ,r,s > 0 
where B(r,s) is the incomplete Beta function. The mean and variance of p are given, 
respectively, by: 
r
E[p] = 
r + s 
rs 
V [p] = 
(r + s)2(r + s + 1) 
Given the NRC experience, let the mean be E[p] = 0.0241 and the standard deviation be 
V [p] = 2 ∗ E[p]. This results in a prior distribution that is relatively uniform over the 
area of interest so that the prior does not overly inﬂuence the results. Figure 14 depicts the 
resulting prior distribution. 
Typically, the maximum allowed load on each generator is 60% of the rated value, 
therefore at least two of the generators are necessary for minimum support of the power 
required by the two plants. In the event that only two generators are operational, air con­
ditioning (A/C) and other support functions would be cycled on/off to keep the plants fully 
operational. Figure 15 depicts the time to failure distribution of the diesel generators con­
sidering that 2 of 3 must be functioning and that each generator has a certain probability of 
not starting when called. The sharp rise at 72 hours is due to the limited source of on-site 
fuel. 
6.4 Battery Reliability 
Battery backup consists of a bank of valve-regulated lead-acid (VRLA) batteries. VRLA 
batteries are a well established technology [4] used as a backup power source for short 
33

S
in
g
le
 G
e
n
e
ra
to
r
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
λ G
 (
F
a
il
u
re
 E
v
e
n
ts
 p
e
r 
Y
e
a
r)
Frequency
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
0
.2
0
0
.3
0
0
.4
0
0
.5
0
0
.6
0
0
.7
0
0
.8
0
0
.9
0
1
.0
0
Cumulative Dist Function
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 In
te
rv
al
M
ed
ia
n
(0
.8
)
(4
9.
6)
(1
1)
(S
p
ri
n
t 
=
 0
.9
67
)
(S
p
ri
n
t)
(N
R
C
=
 1
9.
55
)
(N
R
C
)
Figure 13. Diesel Generator Failure Rate Distribution
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Figure 14. Generator Failure to Start Distribution
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periods of time. Common batteries used in the telecommunications site include C&D [15] 
and East Penn [7]. The batteries are assumed to be in three groups of strings: Earth Station 
(16 strings), MSB-1 (28 strings), MSB-2 (16 strings). In particular, Plant 1 has an 8,000 
amp shunt and has 16 strings of C&D HD-1300, Plant 2 has a 10,000 amp shunt and has 
28 strings of C&D HD-1300, and Plant 3 has a 15,000 amp shunt and has 8 strings of C&D 
HD-1300 and 8 strings of East Penn AVR95-33. 
Cantor et al [5] describes the performance characteristics of VRLA batteries by exam­
ining the capacity for the cells in its survey of VRLA batteries. Their deﬁnition of failure 
as used in their tables is that a cell did not meet a speciﬁc battery capacity level (e.g. 80%, 
60%, or 50% capacity). Typically, the 80% capacity-level is used by manufacturers to de­
termine a failed battery for the purposes of warranty protection. In communications with 
Sprint to determine the sizing of the batteries used at their Orlando site, it is assumed that 
Sprint uses the 80% capacity-level in order to size their batteries to meet a 3-hour backup 
power protection. If the batteries have not degraded and have closer to 100% capacity, it 
would be expected that the backup power might last up to 4 hours. 
Per IEEE Std 1188 [14], the percent capacity of a VRLA battery at 25◦C (77◦F): 
taPc = × 100 (1)
ts 
where ta is the actual time of the test to speciﬁed voltage level as corrected for temperature 
and ts is the rated time to speciﬁed terminal voltage. 
Per IEEE Standard 1188, it is assumed that although the Cantor paper lists a cell as 
failed, the battery cell is still providing some residual capacity. In particular, in Cantor [5] 
for VRLA batteries still in their useful life only 2% of the cells (332 out of 13733) failed to 
maintain a 50% capacity-level, 4% failed to maintain a 60% capacity-level, and 13% failed 
to maintain an 80% capacity-level. Assuming that this is an appropriate mixture of ages 
that are seen in the real world and normalizing the results: 5% of the cells would have failed 
to maintain a 50% capacity-level, 8% would have failed to maintain a 60% capacity-level, 
and 22% would have failed to maintain an 80% capacity-level. 
Since the degradation of capacity is dependent on the use temperature, cycling, charging 
characteristics, etc., it is assumed that cells in a facility experience the same degradation of 
capacities over their lifetimes. In particular, consider the East Penn AVR95-33 (a complete 
48V string comprised of 2 stacks being 6 modules high where each module has 2 cells and 
all 24 cells housed in the same cabinet), it is expected that all of the cells in the strings 
would have the same performance characteristics over their lifetimes. 
From a reliability perspective, the multiple string arrangements at the Orlando site are 
assumed to take on a skewed probability density function curve as depicted in Figure 16. 
Given IEEE Standard 1188 and that Sprint uses 80% capacity for sizing a 3 hour backup 
time, the assumed capacities can be translated into the times to failure that would rea­
sonably apply at the Orlando site. For 16-string: 2% chance of not working at all , 5% 
chance of discharging ≤ 2 hours , 25% chance of discharging ≤ 3 hours , 100% chance of 
discharging < 4 hours. 
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Figure 16. Battery Reliability 
For 28-string: 3% chance of not working at all (increased chance over the 16-string), 
8% chance of discharging ≤ 2 hours, 40% chance of discharging ≤ 3 hours, 100% chance 
of discharging < 4 hours. Considering this distribution of discharge times, the ﬁnal proba­
bility of failure of the supply of battery power to the facility is given in Figure 17. 
6.5 Base Case Summary 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Base Case conﬁguration; recall that this represents a 
summary of the reliability characteristics of the current conﬁguration at the Sprint telecom­
munications facility under the operational scenario assumed. Figure 18 depicts the results 
graphically. 
Table 3. Base Case Time to Failure Summary 
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00% 
Base Case Total Tbase = TU + TG + TB 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531 
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457 
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514 
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72 
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53 
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7 Base Case Considering Utility Repair 
In this section, the possibility of repair of the utility power is explored. The analysis quan­
tiﬁes the power availability and provides a basis for comparison of the analysis results 
associated with the Base Case with the experience of Sprint engineers. 
Let TR be the time that it takes for the utility to restore power after an outage. If the time 
to restore utility power is more than the time that power is available through a combination 
of diesel generators and batteries, than the facility is without power for a period of time: 
P{facility down}=P{TR < TG + TB} (see Figure 19). If Tbase is the time that power is 
available for the Base Case (no utility repair), then Tdelta = TU + TR − Tbase. The P{facility 
down}= P{Tdelta < 0}. 
TU
0
TG
TB
Tbase=TU+TG+TB
Utility w/ Repair
2/3
TR
Tdelta
Figure 19. Time Line with Utility Repair (Tdelta) 
7.1 Utility Down-time 
Aswith the reliability characterization, it will again be assumed that the length of time that a 
utility power is not available is also an exponentially distributed random variable. Based on 
41

data from Sprint the average outage time of µoutage = 6.45 hours, and a standard deviation 
of σoutage = 6.54 hours [22]. By deﬁnition, λ = 1/µ so E[λ] = 0.155 and V [λ] = 0.0234. 
As before, assume that the rate λ is a random variable characterized by a Gamma distri­
bution with E[λ] = αβ,V [λ] = αβ2, respectively. Simultaneously solving the two equations 
for the two unknowns yields values of: α = 1.0281 failures/year and β = 0.150801. Fig­
ure 20 depicts the resulting Gamma distribution. The above analysis implies that there is 
a 90% probability that the repair rate is in the interval [0.108634,0.459933] repairs/hour 
or equivalently, that there is a 90% probability that the time to repair is in the interval 
[2.17423,117.464], as depicted in Figure 21. 
7.2 Comparison 
Figure 22 depicts the probability of the event Tdelta = TR − (TG + TB) and the results are 
summarized in Table 4. As noted previously, the Pr{Tdelta > 0}is the probability that, 
under the assumptions in this analysis, the telecommunications facility is without power; 
the generators and batteries will either fail or be exhausted before utility power is restored. 
From the analysis, there is approximately an 8% chance the facility will be without power 
and a 7% chance that it will be without power for 10 hours or less. Conversations with 
engineers at Sprint have conﬁrmed that, given the scenario, these results are reasonable. 
(For convenience, the speciﬁc values from Figure 22 are presented in Table 5.) 
Table 4. Base Case Time to Failure Summary (w/Utility Repair) 
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00% 
Base Case Total Tbase = TU + TG + TB 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531 
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457 
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514 
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72 
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53 
Utility Time to Restore TR 106.2 15300 0.7199 6.409 56.08 
Tdelta 35.49 12970 -73.99 -67.1 -9.985 
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Table 5. Frequency Table of Tdelta = TR − (TG + TB) 
Tdelta Frequency Cumulative % 
-80 
-75 
-70 
-65 
-60 
-55 
-50 
-45 
-40 
-35 
-30 
-25 
-20 
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
0 
10137 
182653 
87289 
46811 
29781 
20760 
15691 
12500 
10333 
8900 
7611 
6491 
5831 
5075 
4468 
3856 
.00% 
2.03% 
38.56% 
56.02% 
65.38% 
71.33% 
75.49% 
78.62% 
81.12% 
83.19% 
84.97% 
86.49% 
87.79% 
88.96% 
89.97% 
90.87% 
91.64% 
5 
10 
3207 
2567 
92.28% 
92.79% 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
2245 
1917 
1681 
1522 
1333 
1258 
1112 
93.24% 
93.62% 
93.96% 
94.27% 
94.53% 
94.78% 
95.01% 
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8 Distributed Energy Resources

The following sections discuss the analysis of two alternatives to traditional utility power. 
These alternatives are based on the use of natural gas turbines to provide generation of 
power immediately at the telecommunications facility. Two conﬁgurations of interest to 
Sprint were a single Kawasaki turbine and an arrangement of four pallets, each with six 
Capstone natural gas microturbines. Both of these conﬁgurations depend on a supply of 
natural gas; therefore, the reliable supply of the natural gas is critical. The immediate 
section addresses the supply of natural gas and the following sections document research 
into the two turbine conﬁgurations. 
Effectively analysis of the operational scenario proposed by Sprint involves relying on 
the turbine as the primary facility power source and the use of the Base Case conﬁguration 
as the backup power supply. This is depicted in Figure 23. 
TU
0
TG
TB
Utility w/o Repair
DER Case
2/3
Fuel
Available
Gen
Start
TTurbine+NG
Figure 23. Time Line for DER Analyses 
8.1 Natural Gas Pipeline Reliability 
The Ofﬁce of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the U. S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), has overall regulatory respon­
sibility for hazardous liquid and gas pipelines under its jurisdiction in the United States. 
Federal safety standards are described in U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 49 
Transportation, Parts 190 - 199 [19]. There are over 2 million miles of pipelines that sup­
port the movement of hazardous liquids, natural gas and propane. The two types of natural 
gas pipelines are transmission and distribution. Transmission lines typically involve the 
transportation of natural gas between a storage facility or between a distribution center and 
a large volume customer. There are approximately 305,000 miles of transmission pipeline 
in the US. In general, pipelines that are not transmission related are distribution pipelines. 
Distribution lines branch from transmission lines and supply natural gas to consumers. The 
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focus of this effort involves the 1,860,000 miles of pipeline involved with distribution of 
natural gas. 
There are a number of failure modes for pipelines, most of which are unique to the area 
where the pipeline is located and include corrosion, external forces (such as excavation 
or natural forces), and material failure among many other factors. To characterize the 
probability of failure of a particular distribution line can be extremely complicated. For 
example, failure due to corrosion is dependent on such factors as the type and condition of 
the pipes coating, the effectiveness of corrosion control equipment, and the soil conditions 
surrounding the pipe. Alternatively, the probability of pipeline damage as the result of third 
party damage depends on, for example, the extent and type of excavation or agricultural 
activity along the pipeline right-of-way and the depth of cover over the pipeline. 
The natural gas provider in Orlando has indicated that they will furnish and install the 
pipeline some 4 miles (6.437 km) away. A typical feeder line for a natural gas turbine (e.g. 
a 1.5 mW Kawasaki turbine site in San Luis Obispo, CA) has a 4” (101.6 mm) feeder 
with cutoff connected into an on-site turbine compressor station. A 4” (101.6 mm) pipe is 
connected into the turbine from the pump station. 
Historically, the dominant failure mode for natural gas distribution pipe line is a result 
of external factors involving third-parties, e.g. excavation. The rate at which these failures 
occur are a function of the buried depth, how well the pipeline is marked, the density of the 
population and the land use of the area of interest. The factors can be used to augment the 
basic failure rate established for pipes of a particular diameter [17]. 
Contribution of external factors to the failure rate of the pipeline: 
λExt = λdKdcKwt KpdKpm 
where λd is the basic failure rate for pipes of diameter d, and the correction factors Kdc, Kwt , 
Kpd, and Kpm account for failure due to third-party activities: buried depth, wall thickness, 
population density and prevention method. Assuming a distribution pipe diameter of 102 
mm, an estimate of the basic failure rate is λd = 0.218 failures/ 1000 km-year (Table 2, 
[17]) . 
It is assumed that for the facility in question that the area is rural Kpd = 0.81 and best 
protection method is employed and the length of pipe is 6.44 km. Estimates of the failure 
rates are from [20], and [17]. Speciﬁcally, the following assumptions are made in the 
analysis: 
Kdc - worst case is to assume depth of cover is less than 0.91 m: Kdc = 2.54, best case is 
to assume that depth of cover is greater than 1.22 m: Kdc = 0.54. 
Kwt - worst case is to presume that the wall thickness of pipe will be no more than the 
minimum of 4.8 mm: Kwt = 1.0 and best case assumes that the thickness is greater 
than 4.8 mm: Kwt = 0.2. 
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� 
Kpd - the location of the telecommunication center appears to be rather remote (7 miles 
of dirt road). Assume that the area is rural (best case): Kpd = 0.81 and the worst 
case assumption is that the distribution pipe is laid through a densely populated area: 
Kpd = 18.77. 
Kpm - worst case situation implies that there are only marker posts to delineate the location 
of the distribution line: Kpm = 1.03 while for best case additional methods are used: 
Kpm = 0.91. 
Best Case (failures/year): 
λb =λdKdcKwt KpdKpm ∗ d 
=(0.000218)(0.54)(0.2)(0.81)(0.91)(6.44) 
=0.000112 
Worst Case (failures/year): 
λb =λdKdcKwt KpdKpm ∗ d 
=(0.000218)(2.54)(1.0)(18.77)(1.03)(6.44) 
=0.06894 
The probability of failure in one year is then assumed to be in the range: Fng = {1− 
exp[−0.000112] = 0.000012,1− exp[−0.06894] = 0.06662}. The failure rate of pipeline 
is assumed to be a random variable characterized by a lognormal distribution with a 5% 
lower limit of 0.000112 and an upper 95% limit of 0.06894. 
τ � τ � 
f (λ|µ,τ) = 
2πλ2 
exp −
2
(logλ − µ)2 , λ > 0 (2) 
Solving for µ and τ given the upper and lower bounds yields values of µ = −5.88577 and 
τ = 0.262366. Figure 24 depicts the ﬁnal distribution for the time to failure of the natural 
gas pipeline. As with other elements in the system, the time to failure for the pipeline is 
assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable: TNG ∼ exp[−λNGt], where 
λNG represents the rate at which pipeline failures occur. 
8.2 Capstone Microturbine Analysis 
The Capstone microturbines were suggested by Sprint as one possible alternative power 
generation source. Emissions are low: approximately 2.3 ppmvd NOx per generator for 
75% loading and about 2.0 ppmvd NOx for 100% loading (parts per million on dry volume 
basis). 
Figure 25 shows six C60 microturbines being used to provide prime power and heat at 
the Guisborough Hall luxury hotel in the UK (photo courtesy of Capstone). 
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Figure 25. Six Capstone C60 Turbines at Guisborough Hall, UK 
The current planned conﬁguration of Capstone turbines consists of four pallets of six 
turbines for a total of 24 turbines. Each turbine is capable of 60 kW of output and for 
efﬁciency purposes the turbines are exercised at 90% of their capacity. The total available 
power is then 1.296 mW. The current maximum demand is approximately 1.1 mW, leaving 
an excess capacity of 196 kW. At the peak level of loading, only 21 of the 24 Capstone 
turbines are needed to supply power for MSB-1, MSB-2 and the Earth Station combined. 
Sprint suggested that the facility could be supported at a minimum level if even seven of 
the microturbines were unavailable. 
According to Capstone engineers, these turbines are currently in-place at a variety of 
locations and have attained 95% availability. The overall design life is 40,000 hours and 
Capstone engineers have estimated the mean time to failure to be 8000 hours and noted 
that they expect this to double over the next few years. There are scheduled maintenance 
activities at 8,000 and 20,000 hours. The 8,000 maintenance is to change air and some 
other ﬁlters and replacing the igniter. The downtime for this service is 3 hours. The 20,000 
hour service includes the 8,000 hour actions plus changing of fuel injectors. The downtime 
for this service is 12 hours. 
To characterize the uncertainty in the failure rate for a single Capstone microturbine, 
it was assumed that there was a 20% chance that the failure rate would be greater than 
λ = 1/8000. Further, it was assumed that there was an 90% probability that the failure rate 
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would be less than λ = 1/16000. (The relatively large value of 20% was due to the lack of 
ﬁeld data to support the 1/8000 estimate.) 
Finally, assuming an underlying lognormal distribution for the turbine failure rate and 
solving for µ and τ yields values of µ = −9.40558 and τ = 9.38253. The time to failure for 
a single Capstone turbine is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable: 
TC1 ∼ exp[−λC1t], where λC1 represents the rate at which turbine failures occur. Figure 26 
depicts the resulting distribution for the time to failure for a single Capstone turbine. 
Since there is excess capacity with the Capstone package of turbines, the system can be 
operated in two modes: cold standby or hot standby. In cold standby, the excess turbines are 
not operated and are started only in the event of a failure of one of the primary generators. 
In hot standby, all 24 turbines are operated continuously, but each at a lower load level. In 
either case, the minimum number of turbines operating at full capacity deﬁnes the point at 
which the DER system can successfully provide power to the facility. 
One conﬁguration suggested by Sandia consisted of running the 21 turbines with the 
full available load and the cycling through the remaining three turbines during peak load. 
In this case the three turbines are available in ’cold standby’. In this conﬁguration, the 
turbines are running at approximately 87% of their capacity for a net efﬁciency of about 
28%. While this conﬁguration was not fully investigated, the overall reliability of the 
Capstone system would increase (relative to the following discussion). However, issues 
associated with failure at turbine start-up from cold-standby would need to be considered 
and may offset the gain in reliability. 
An alternative conﬁguration suggested by Sprint involved running the full bank of 
twenty-four turbines to support the available load. The drawback of this approach is a small 
drop in turbine efﬁciency. In this conﬁguration, the turbines are running at approximately 
76% of their capacity for a net efﬁciency of approximately 27.5%. The ﬁnal conﬁguration 
proposed by Sprint and addressed in the following discussion, involves running all 24 tur­
bines until seven turbines fail. It was felt by Sprint engineers that this was a more likely 
scenario and that the seven failures would reﬂect a worst case operational conﬁguration. 
Figure 27 depicts the results for the analysis assuming the failure of seven turbines or 
the loss of the supply of natural gas. The median time to failure for the seventh turbine is 
perhaps a bit surprising at 3800 hours, considerably less than the 8300 hour median time to 
failure for an individual Capstone turbine. This is an artifact of running all 24 Capstones 
simultaneously with no repair. As depicted in Figure 23, assume that the Capstone mi­
croturbines as the primary power source for the facility and the current system, (i.e. Base 
Case) is used as a backup power source. Figure 28 summarizes the probability distribution 
of the time to failure for the Capstone conﬁguration. Finally, another reliability issue re­
lates to the physical conﬁguration of four pallets of six turbines. Depending on how the the 
power system was conﬁgured, it is possible that a single failure of the power distribution 
system might result in an entire pallet of six (operational) turbines being off-line. The out­
come would be conﬁguration that was a single point of failure for the entire facility. The 
likelihood of these events is very low, but requires attention during design. 
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Figure 26. Capstone Single Turbine Hours to Failure (TC1 ) 
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8.3 Kawasaki Turbine 
A second power system conﬁguration involves the use of a single Kawasaki natural gas 
turbine. A typical turbine for this application is the GPB 15X 1.5 mW turbine (Figure 29). 
With the addition of an combustion/catalyst system the emissions of the Kawasaki turbine 
are low: approximately 3 ppmvd (parts per million on dry volume basis) NOx (15% O2) 
over a broad range of power. Kawasaki has provided an MTTF = 200,974 hours and an 
Figure 29. Kawasaki Turbine 
MTTR = 3.1 hours, based on a sample of 150 installed units. The pictures in Figure 30 
are from the Kawasaki GPB brouchure [18]. To characterize the uncertainty in the failure 
rate for a Kawasaki turbine, it is assumed that there was a 10% chance that the failure 
rate would be greater than λK = 1/200974. Since this number is exceptionally high, to be 
conservative, it is assumed that the median failure rate was twice as bad as that reported by 
Kawasaki. This implies that there is a 50% chance that the failure rate might be as high as 
2× λK . 
As with the Capstone mircroturbine, the failure rate is assumed to be a random vari­
able characterized with a lognormal distribution. Solving for µ and τ yields values of 
µ = −11.5.178 and τ = 3.41839. The time to failure for a single Kawasaki turbine is 
assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable: TK ∼ exp[−λKt], where λK 
represents the rate at which turbine failures occur. Given the estimated values for µ and τ, 
Figure 31 depicts the resulting distribution for the time to failure for a Kawasaki turbine. 
Note that, while the lower bound on the uncertainty interval is very high, there is substan­
tial uncertainty in the time to failure. This is an artifact of the assumption that there may be 
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Figure 30. Kawasaki Footprint 
considerable uncertainty assumed in the failure rate estimate provided by Kawasaki. The 
assumptions used in characterizing the failure rate ’pulled’ the time to failure distribution 
in Figure 32 to the left while allowing for the possibility that the estimates of the failure 
rate provided by Kawasaki may be reasonable. One perspective on this result is that there 
is a high probability that the Kawasaki turbine will result in a much higher reliability. 
As depicted in Figure 23, assume that the Kawasaki turbine acts as the primary power 
source for the facility and the current system, (i.e. Base Case) is used as a backup power 
source. The time to failure for a facility depending on a single Kawasaki natural gas turbine 
as the power source is summarized in Figure 32. 
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9 Conclusion 
Figure 33 summarizes the results of the three analyses: Base Case, Capstone microturbine 
array, and the single Kawasaki turbine. The overlay provides the capability to make a 
risk-based decision of the relative reliability beneﬁts of the the three alternatives through a 
comparison of the credibility limits for each alternative. Table 6 provides a summary of all 
previous related analysis. 
Table 6. Analysis Summary 
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00% 
Capstone TTF TFC 5419 2514 2698 4960 8706 
Kawasaki TTF TFK 1.04E+05 137200 7969 59010 249100 
Base Case Total Tbase 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531 
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457 
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514 
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72 
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53 
Since there is no overlap between the credibility limits a comparison is relatively straight­
forward. Consider a comparison between the reliability of the current power supply (i.e. 
Base Case) and the array conﬁguration of Capstone microturbines suggested by Sprint. 
There is a 90% chance that the utility power will fail before 2457 hours, while there is a 
90% chance that the Capstone array will provide power for at least 2698 hours. 
Finally, consider that there is a 90% probability that the Capstone array will fail to 
provide power for less than approximately 8706 hours, while there is a 90% probability 
that the single Kawasaki turbine will provide power for at least 7969 hours. 
A signiﬁcant, but not decisive element in the lower reliability estimate for the Capstone 
was the conﬁguration and operational plan suggested by Sprint. Other conﬁgurations could 
have quite different reliability characteristics and may warrant further investigation. How­
ever, there are installation issues associated with the Capstone, e.g. special enclosure, that 
could be a factor in the ﬁnal decision. 
Not considered in the analysis for either the Kawasaki or Capstone conﬁgurations is the 
probability that the turbines will fail to start when called. Just as with the diesel generators, 
there is a likelihood that if the Capstone turbines are left in cold-standby, they will fail to 
start. Clearly, this is less of a consideration of the Kawasaki turbine since this turbine is on 
24/7. Also, not considered in the analyses is consideration for the differences in the control 
systems for the two turbines. 
In conclusion, even given the uncertainties in the three alternatives, the clear choice 
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is the use of the Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the primary power source for the Sprint 
telecommunication facility. 
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A Original Fault Trees
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battery
B Base Case.v7 - WinBugs Code 
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000 
samples. 
model{

fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf)

fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf)

fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf)

e1˜ dbern(fstart1)

e2˜ dbern(fstart2)

e3˜ dbern(fstart3)

# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti

# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same

# LambdaG is in units of years

tfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)

tfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)

tfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)

tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours

tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours

tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours

LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)

tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )

LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)

tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)

tfUu<- hours*tyUu

#LambdaUd is already in hours

LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)

tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)

fbat˜dbeta(aB,bB)

eb˜ dbern(fbat)

# we will assume that if the battery works, we will get timebat hours of use from the

# eb=1-> success eb=0 (failure)

tfB<- eb*timebat

TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd

TF<- tfUu + tfG + tfB

Tdelta <- TFdelta - TF
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} 
list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760, timebat=3, 
aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412, 
aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19, 
aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126, 
aB=3.70868, bB=2.78512) 
list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=1) 
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C Capstone.v2- WinBugs Code 
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000 
samples. 
model{ # Capstone 7/24 v2.2 lognormal turbine failure rate PDF)

fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf)

fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf)

fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf)

e1˜ dbern(fstart1)

e2˜ dbern(fstart2)

e3˜ dbern(fstart3)

# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti

# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same

# LambdaG is in units of years

LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)

ttfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)

ttfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)

ttfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)

tfG1<- min(ttfG1, fueltime)

tfG2<- min(ttfG2, fueltime)

tfG3<- min(ttfG3, fueltime)

tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours

tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours

tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours

tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )

# utility up-time

LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)

tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)

tfUu<- hours*tyUu

#LambdaUd is already in hours

LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)

tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)

#Battery Code

j ˜ dunif(0, 1)

tfb16 <- alpha16[J] + beta16[J]*(j - x.change16[J])
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J <- 1 + step(j - x1.change16) + step(j - x2.change16) + step(j - x3.change16)

k ˜ dunif(0, 1)

tfb28 <- alpha28[K] + beta28[K]*(k - x.change28[K])

K <- 1 + step(k - x1.change28) + step(k - x2.change28) + step(k - x3.change28)

tfB <- min(tfb16, tfb28)

# natural gas

# for the Turbine, two failure modes are possible

# either the natural gas line is cut or the turbine fails

ttfNG˜dexp(LambdaNG)

LambdaNG˜dlnorm(aNG,bNG)

tfNG<-ttfNG*hours

LambdaC˜dlnorm(aC,bC)

#generate failure times for operational turbine

for (i in 1:24) {

tfc[i] ˜dexp(LambdaC)

}

# Capstones are lost when 7th turbine fails

tfCh <- ranked(tfc[],7)

tfC1 <- ranked(tfc[],1)

# power can only last as long as either

# the NG is available or Capstones are operating

tfCap<-min(tfNG, tfCh)

#Tdelta = time without backup (including restoration)

TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd

Tbase <- tfUu+tfG+tfB

TF<- tfCap + tfUu + tfG + tfB

Tdelta <- TFdelta - (tfUu+tfG+tfB)

}

list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760,

aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412, 
aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19, 
aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126, 
aNG=-5.89, bNG=0.26236, 
aC= -9.40558, bC=9.38253, 
beta16 = c(0, 66.67, 5, 1.333), 
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alpha16 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),

x.change16 = c(0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.25),

x1.change16 = 0.02,

x2.change16 = 0.05,

x3.change16 = 0.25,

beta28 = c(0, 40, 3.125, 1.667),

alpha28 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),

x.change28 = c(0, 0.03, 0.08, 0.40),

x1.change28 = 0.03,

x2.change28 = 0.08,

x3.change28 = 0.40)

list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=19, LambdaC=1)
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D Kawasaki.v5- WinBugs Code 
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000 
samples. 
model{ #Kawasaki v8 (lognormal Kawasaki failure rate PDF) 
fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf) 
fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf) 
fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf) 
e1˜ dbern(fstart1)

e2˜ dbern(fstart2)

e3˜ dbern(fstart3)

# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti

# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same

# LambdaG is in units of years

LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)

ttfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)

ttfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)

ttfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)

tfG1<- min(ttfG1, fueltime)

tfG2<- min(ttfG2, fueltime)

tfG3<- min(ttfG3, fueltime)

tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours

tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours

tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours

tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )

# utility up-time

LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)

tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)

tfUu<- hours*tyUu

#LambdaUd is already in hours

LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)

tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)

#Battery Code

j ˜ dunif(0, 1)

tfb16 <- alpha16[J] + beta16[J]*(j - x.change16[J])
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J <- 1 + step(j - x1.change16) + step(j - x2.change16) + step(j - x3.change16)

k ˜ dunif(0, 1)

tfb28 <- alpha28[K] + beta28[K]*(k - x.change28[K])

K <- 1 + step(k - x1.change28) + step(k - x2.change28) + step(k - x3.change28)

tfB <- min(tfb16, tfb28)

# natural gas

# for the Turbine, two failure modes are possible

# either the natural gas line is cut or the turbine fails

ttfNG˜dexp(LambdaNG)

LambdaNG˜dlnorm(aNG,bNG)

tfNG<-ttfNG*hours

LambdaK˜dlnorm(aK,bK)

ttfK˜dexp(LambdaK)

tfKh<-ttfK

tfK<-min(tfNG, tfKh)

#Tdelta = time without backup (including restoration)

TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd

Tbase <- tfUu+tfG+tfB

TF<- tfK + tfUu + tfG + tfB

Tdelta <- TFdelta - Tbase

}

list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760,

aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412,

aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19,

aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126,

aNG=-5.89, bNG=0.26236,

aK=-11.5178, bK=3.14839,

beta16 = c(0, 66.67, 5, 1.333),

alpha16 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),

x.change16 = c(0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.25),

x1.change16 = 0.02,

x2.change16 = 0.05,

x3.change16 = 0.25,

beta28 = c(0, 40, 3.125, 1.667),

alpha28 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),

x.change28 = c(0, 0.03, 0.08, 0.40),

x1.change28 = 0.03,
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x2.change28 = 0.08, 
x3.change28 = 0.40) 
list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=19, LambdaK=0.01) 
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